Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers by Gostin, Lawrence O.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
1991 
Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic 
and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers 
Lawrence O. Gostin 
Georgetown University Law Center, gostin@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/763 
 
17 Am. J.L. & Med. 109-144 (1991) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Health Law and 
Policy Commons, Health Policy Commons, Public Health Commons, and the Public Policy Commons 
Genetic Discrimination: The Use of
Genetically Based Diagnostic and
Prognostic Tests by Employers
and Insurers*
Larry Gostin**
Genetic discrimination is detrimental to public health programs, as well
as to society generally. Advances in genetic testing and screening, acceler-
ated and prompted by the Human Genome Initiative, increase society's abil-
ity to detect and monitor chromosomal differences. These technologies and
their resulting genomic data will enhance medical science, but may also en-
courage discrimination. Although few employers or insurers currently util-
ize genetic screening, testing or data, rising employee benefit costs and
market forces create powerful incentives for usage.
Current municipal, state and federal laws, including the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), may not sufficiently protect employees and insureds
from genetic discrimination. While municipal and state protections should
not be overlooked, the ADA's sweeping scope may currently provide the
most comprehensive safeguard. Federal laws banning discrimination on the
basis of race or sex might also successfully redress some forms of genetic
discrimination. Genetic technologies' advent necessitates efforts to rectify
state and federal statutory coverage gaps, strictly regulate employers and
produce comprehensive guidelines regarding its use.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Human Genome Initiative places squarely before society a set
of legitimate values that conflicts with the anti-discrimination princi-
ple.' This paper analyzes the law, ethics and public policy concerning
* An earlier version of this paper was written for the National Center for Human Genome
Research, Working Group on Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Related to Mapping and
Sequencing the Human Genome. I would like to thank Alissa Spielberg for her research
assistance on the project.
** Executive Director, American Society of Law & Medicine.
I See Liebman, Too Much Information: Predictions of Employee Disease and the Fringe Benefit Sys-
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"genetic discrimination," defined as the denial of rights, privileges or
opportunities on the basis of information obtained from genetically-
based diagnostic and prognostic tests.2 The Human Genome Initiative
will enhance the ability to gather and organize information that may
predict a person's future potential and disabilities. Enormous human
benefits may ensue from understanding the etiology and pathophysi-
ology of genetic disorders,' including disease prevention through ge-
netic counseling, and treatment of the disorders through genetic
manipulation.4 This information will help clinicians understand and
eventually treat many of the more than 4,000 diseases known to be
caused by single-gene defects,5 as well as multifactorial diseases.6
Unfortunately, the Human Genome Initiative also has potential for
social detriment. One day, employers and insurers will be able to ob-
tain a genetic profile from the blood drawn from a small finger prick.7
This profile will go beyond discrete conditions, such as Huntington dis-
ease, sickle cell, cystic fibrosis and Duchene muscular dystrophy. The
employer may further analyze an employee's susceptibility to a wide
range of physical conditions such as cancer, heart disease, Alzheimer's
disease and schizophrenia. 8
As our ability to detect genetic defects or propensities toward ill-
ness increases, so too does the threat that such detection will be used to
discriminate. Prejudice, alienation and exclusion often accompany ge-
tern, 1988 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 57 (reviewing the development of the anti-discrimination
principle).
2 See P. Billings, M. Kohn, M. de Cuevas &J. Beckwith, Genetic Discrimination as a Con-
sequence of Genetic Screening 6 (Oct. 24, 1990) (unpublished manuscript), to be published in
AM.J. HUM. GENETICS (1991) [hereinafter Billings] (defining genetic discrimination as "differ-
ential treatment based on apparent or perceived human variation presumed to have a genetic
origin").
3 Etiology is the science of the causes or origins of diseases. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIc-
TIONARY 489 (4th unabridged ed. 1976). Pathophysiology is the branch of biology dealing
with the functions and vital processes of disease. Id. at 1041.
4 See generally Antonarakis, The Mapping and Sequencing of the Human Genome, 83 S. MED. J.
876, 878 (1990); Goldstein & Brown, Genetic Aspects of Disease, in HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNAL MEDICINE 285 (E. Braunwald, K. Isselbacher, R. Peterdorf, J. Wilson, J. Martin & A.
Fauci eds. 1987).
5 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Public Health Service, National lnsts. of Health,
National Center for Hum. Genome Res.) & U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY (Office of Energy Res.,
Office of Health & Envtl. Res., Human Genome Program), UNDERSTANDING OUR GENETIC
INHERITANCE: THE U.S. HUMAN GENOME PROJECT: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS FY 1991-1995 vii
(1990) [hereinafter THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT].
6 1d.
7 See Hening, Body and Mind High-Tech Fortunetelling, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1989, § 6
(Magazine), at 20; Liebman, supra note 1, at 60.
8 Liebman, supra note 1, at 60 ("Suddenly the job applicant is not a member of an undif-
ferentiated population . . . [but has] a statistically analyzable medical future,"). See also J.
BISHOP & M. WALDHOLZ, GENOME 285-306 (1990) (describing incidences where genetic
screening has been used).
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netically related diseases even though, by definition, the condition is
neither subject to the person's control, nor the result of willful behav-
ior. The fact that genetic diseases are sometimes closely associated
with discrete ethnic, or racial groups such as African Americans,'
Ashkenazi Jews' ° or Armenians" compounds the potential for invidi-
ous discrimination.' 2 Preventing discrimination based upon a person's
health care status, and providing equal opportunities for persons with
disease and disability are both powerful societal goals fully recognized
by Congress' 3 and the courts.
14
The demand for genomic information, however, can be rational.
Genomic data can promote the health of people having genetic predis-
positions to disease by excluding them from hazardous environments;
ensure that workers are fit for employment by requiring them to meet
qualification standards; and save costs, by not hiring persons having a
high probability of disproportionately burdening company benefit
plans. In an age when large employers pay as much, or more, for
health and welfare benefits as for the raw materials of production, they
are anxious to improve productivity and lower personnel costs.' 5
Thus, decisions based on genetic information cannot always be attrib-
uted to pernicious myths, irrational fears or ethnic hatred. The Human
Genome Initiative therefore accelerates societal conflict between the
rights of individuals and institutions.' 6
This paper explores the legal and ethical constraints that ensure
genomic information is used only to protect a person's health or safety,
or enforce legitimate job, service or benefit criteria. This paper reviews
the scope, prevalence and potential of genetic discrimination, and why
such discrimination violates fundamental principles of human rights
and undermines the public health goals that are the true promise of the
Genome Initiative. The paper then examines whether the Americans
with Disabilities Act and the corpus of anti-discrimination law are suffi-
9 E.g., sickle cell disease.
1o E.g., Bloom's Syndrome, Gaucher's disease (adult form), Tay-Sachs disease.
I I E.g., Familial Mediterranean fever.
12 See generally Goldstein & Brown, supra note 4, at 588 (Table 57-1: Examples of simply
inherited disorders that occur with increased frequency in specific ethnic groups); see also T.
DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS 160-62 (1990) (Appendix C: The Ethnic Distribution of
Disease).
13 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 10 1-336, 104 Stat. 376
(codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.A., 47 U.S.C.A. and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213
(West Supp. 1990)).
14 See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1024
(1987).
15 See generally Rothstein, Employee Selection Based on Susceptibility to Occupational Illness, 81
MICH. L. REv. 1379 (1983).
16 See generally Beckwith, The Human Genome Initiative: Genetics'Lightning Rod, 17 AM. J.L. &
MED. 1 (1991).
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ciently relevant and comprehensive to safeguard against genetic dis-
crimination. As part of this examination, the paper will discuss genetic
discrimination in two key sectors: employment and insurance. Finally,
the paper proposes future legislative and judicial safeguards against ge-
netic discrimination.
II. PREVALENCE OF AND POTENTIAL FOR GENETIC
DISCRIMINATION: JUSTICE AND PUBLIC HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES
Amidst euphoria generated by the Human Genome Initiative, the
National Institutes of Health 17 and the Congress'" have expressed con-
cern that genomic information may result in stigmatization and discrim-
ination. Indeed, fear of the social impact of the human genome's
discovery may be the most significant impediment to continued full
funding of the project.' 9 Fortunately, most funders appreciate that,
while fear of unknown medical advances does not justify stifling scien-
tific progress, careful ethical planning and legal safeguards are
required.
A. THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
Genetic discrimination violates basic tenets of individual justice
and is detrimental to public health. Discrimination based upon actual
or perceived genetic characteristics denies an individual equal opportu-
nity because of a status over which she has no control. Discrimination
based on genetic factors can be as unjust as that based on race, gender
or disability. In each case, people are treated inequitably, not because
of their inherent abilities, but solely because of pre-determined charac-
teristics. The right to be treated equally and according to one's abili-
ties in all the diverse aspects of human endeavor is a core social value.
Genetic discrimination is harmful not merely because it violates
core social values, but also because it thwarts the creativity and produc-
tivity of human beings, perhaps more than the disability itself. By ex-
cluding qualified individuals from education, employment, government
service or insurance, the marketplace is robbed of skills, energy and
17 See THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 5, at 20-21, 65-73 (Report of the Working
Group on Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Related to Mapping and Sequencing the Human
Genome).
18 See id. at 65; 136 CONG. REC. H4996, H5003 (daily ed.July 19, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Obey) (the human genome project may divide us into "two groups, those with pluperfect and
imperfect genes.... Taxpayers should not be put in the position of financing government
programs without protections to ensure that those programs will not in the end lead to fenc-
ing them out of jobs or reasonably priced health insurance." We need to develop legal and
ethical safeguards "before the knowledge genie is completely out of the bottle.").
19See 136 CONG. REC. H5003 (daily ed. July 19, 1990).
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imagination. Such exclusion promotes physical and economic depen-
dency, draining rather than enriching social institutions. Finally, ge-
netic discrimination also undercuts the Human Genome Initiative's
fundamental purpose of promoting the public health.20 Infusing
human and financial resources into the Genome Initiative is justified by
the promise of clinical benefits in identifying, preventing and effectively
intervening in human disease.2' If fear of discrimination deters people
from genetic diagnosis and prognosis, renders them less willing to con-
fide in physicians and genetic counselors, and makes them more con-
cerned with loss of ajob or insurance than with care and treatment, the
benefits of genetic data collection will not be fully achieved.
Discrimination's public health impact will become clearer as ge-
netic technology advances. The public health justification for wide-
spread collection and utilization of genomic data will increase as
genetic diagnosis and prognosis become more accurate and less expen-
sive, and as gene therapies become standard medical practice. Soci-
ety's ability to develop and implement ambitious genetic screening and
intervention strategies will depend upon the adequacy of safeguards
against breaches of confidence and discrimination.
B. DISCRIMINATION AND SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY
Complex and often pernicious mythologies emerge from public ig-
norance of genetically-based diagnostic and prognostic tests. The com-
mon belief is that genetic technologies generated from scientific
assessment are always accurate, highly predictive and capable of identi-
fying an individual's or offspring's inevitable pre-destination of future
disability. The facts are diametrically opposed to this common belief.
The results of genetic-based diagnosis and prognosis are uncertain for
many reasons. The sensitivity of genetic testing is limited by the known
mutations in a target population. 22 For example, screening can cur-
rently detect only seventy-five percent of Cystic Fibrosis (CF) chromo-
somes in the U.S. white population. 2' In only fifty-six percent of at-risk
20 THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 5, at vii, 20.
21 See Watson, The Human Genome Project: Past, Present, and Future, 248 SCIENCE 44 (1990).
22 See generally McKusick, Mendelian Disorders, in THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE 281, 281-89 (A. Harvey, R. Johns, V. McKusick, A. Owens & R. Ross eds. 1988)
[hereinafter THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICINE].
23 Wilfond & Fost, The Cystic Fibrosis Gene: Medical and Social Implications for Heterozygote
Detection, 263J. A.M.A. 2777, 2779 (1990). A genetic condition such as Cystic Fibrosis (CF) is
caused by mutations in the DNA which produce the disease. Tests for CF seek to identify the
known mutations. J. BISHOP & M. WALDHOLZ, supra note 8, at 289-290. Screening for CF is
now very much on the public agenda, despite cautionary statements by the Public Health
Service and professional organizations. The American Society of Human Genetics Statement on Cystic
Fibrosis Screening, 46 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 393 (1990); Statement from the National Insitutes of
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couples will both persons be identified as carriers.24 Professors
Wilfond and Fost calculate that one out of every two couples from the
general population identified by CF population screening as "at risk"
will be falsely labeled, and therefore, may experience increased anxiety
or discrimination, or needlessly alter their reproductive plans.25
Predicting the nature, severity and course of disease based upon a
genetic marker is an additional difficulty. For most genetic diseases the
onset date, severity of symptoms, and efficacy of treatment and man-
agement are highly variable. Some people remain virtually symptom
free, while others progress to seriously disabling illness. A marker for
Huntington chorea, for example, presents an aura of inevitable relent-
less and progressive neurologic impairment but, in fact, great variabil-
ity appears even among cases diagnosed within the same family. 26
Neurofibromatosis manifests itself with similar variability, as some will
suffer marked disability of the nervous system, muscles, bones and skin,
while others will exhibit minor pigmented spots on their body.27 Addi-
tionally, many gene-associated diseases, unlike CF and Huntington, are
multifactorial and not attributed to a single gene mutation or genetic
marker. Their appearance can depend upon complex interactions of
genetic and environmental factors that cannot be accurately measured.
Current scientific assessments point to numerous, poorly understood,
multifactorial diseases ranging from colon cancer, heart disease and
emphysema, to schizophrenia, depression and alcoholism.21
Genetic-based diagnosis and prognosis, therefore, is heterogene-
ous. The reliability and predictive value of genetic tests are limited by
the extent to which mutations are known and prevalent in the target
population. Variability exists in the onset, presentation and outcome of
disease, and predictions are confounded by a multiplicity of genetic,
biomedical and environmental factors. For all these reasons, significant
scientific uncertainty surrounds much genetic testing.
Genomic information may be highly beneficial for patients and
health care professionals in areas related to prevention, treatment, diet,
Health Workshop on Population Screening for the Cystic Fibrosis Gene, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 70
(1990) [hereinafter NIH Consensus Statement].
24 Wilfond & Fost, supra note 23, at 2779.
2 5 Id. at 2781. Professor Billings and his colleagues recount a case of a family with a child
who has CF and received care through an HMO. When a second pregnancy occurred, a pre-
natal DNA test was positive for two copies of the CF gene. The HMO considered withdrawal
of coverage if the family proceeded with the pregnancy. Threats of legal action were required
before the HMO agreed to continue coverage. Billings, supra note 2, at 18.26 De Long & Moses, Disorders of Movement, in THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICINE,
supra note 22, at 1057, 1069.
27 McKusick, supra note 22, at 286-87.
28 See generally McKusick, Multifactorial Disorders: The Genetics of Common Diseases, in THE
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF MEDICINE, supra note 22, at 303.
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lifestyle or reproductive choices. Employers, insurers, educators, po-
lice and others, however, will surely come to have access to genomic
information. When genomic information is used by social institutions,
not to prevent or treat disease, but to deny opportunity, exclude from
work or benefits, remove health care coverage or restrict liberty, a
whole new dimension to the Genome -Initiative becomes apparent. Ad-
verse employment and insurance decisions are particularly hurtful
when rendered on the basis of false assumptions regarding the nature,
accuracy and predictability of genetic tests.
C. GENETIC SCREENING AND MONITORING
The U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) pro-
vides the only systematic data concerning past, current and future use
of workplace genetic screening and monitoring. 9 A comparable popu-
lation of industrial companies, utilities and trade unions were surveyed
in 1982 and 1989 to provide trend data. The OTA surveys show that
relatively few companies currently utilize genetic screening and moni-
toring. In the 1989 survey, twenty health officers from the 330 Fortune
500 companies responding (six percent) reported the use of genetic
monitoring or screening. Of these, twelve companies were conducting
monitoring or screening, and eight had done so in the past. In 1982,
six companies were currently using the technology, while twelve had
previously done so.30 The rate of current to past monitoring and
screening was reversed from 1982 to 1989, with twice the number of
companies currently using genomic information in 1989 than in
1982. s l
If there has been little or no real growth in the number of compa-
nies conducting genetic monitoring and screening in the workplace,
what do companies foresee for the future? In 1982, fifty-five companies
said they might use genomic information within the next five years. 32
2 9 See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., GENETIC MONITORING AND SCREEN-
ING IN THE WORKPLACE 171-88 (1990) [hereinafter OTA 1990 REPORT]; OFFICE OF TECH. As-
SESSMENT, U.S. CONG., THE ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING IN THE PREVENTION OF OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE 33-46 (1983) [hereinafter OTA 1983 REPORT]. Genetic testing includes a number of
technologies to detect genetic traits, changes in chromosomes, or changes in DNA. The OTA
distinguishes between two different kinds of genetic testing: examining persons for evidence
of induced change in their genetic material (monitoring) and identifying individuals with par-
ticular inherited traits or disorders (screening). OTA 1990 REPORT, supra, at 3-6. The OTA
terminology is somewhat confusing from a public health perspective since testing usually re-
fers to case identification of an individual, while screening involves more systematic applica-
tion to whole populations. See Gostin, Curran & Clark, The Case Against Compulsory Casefinding
in Controlling AIDS: Testing, Screening and Reporting, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 10-11 (1987).
30 OTA 1990 REPORT, supra note 29, at 175-76.
31 Id. at 176, 178. But note that "[t]he increase in the number of'current users' in 1989
could reflect slight differences in question wording between the two surveys." Id. at 176.
32 OTA 1983 REPORT, supra note 29, at 34.
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OTA reports that fewer companies anticipated using genetic testing
and monitoring in' 1989 than in 1982."3 However, in a survey of 400
firms conducted in 1989 by Northwestern National Life Insurance
Company, fifteen percent of companies responded that by the year
2000 they planned to check the genetic status of prospective employees
and their dependents before making employment offers. 34
The only available data from the insurance industry is consistent
with the findings of the OTA employment surveys. In 1989, the Ameri-
can Council on Life Insurance conducted the first study to determine
the industry's use of genetic testing. The Council reported that no in-
surance company performed its own tests, but some accessed known
genomic information in their underwriting decisions.3 5 The Health In-
surance Association of America has formed its own committee and
plans to survey its members on the use of genetic testing."6
The absence of the expected growth in genetic testing and moni-
toring by industry and insurers should not provide grounds for compla-
cency. Employers and insurers utilizing genetic testing did so based
upon its predictive value, scientific consensus and CoSt.3 7 The Human
Genome Initiative's promotion of rapid progress in human molecular
genetics suggests increased occupational and insurance use in the fu-
ture. While industry and insurers are unlikely to routinely use genetic
diagnosis that costs, say, $2,000 - $3,000 per test, as the technology
becomes capable of identifying a battery of genetic conditions at a frac-
tion of the current cost, the sheer competitive nature of industry and
insurance may drive them toward increased testing. American industry
is likely to turn to genetic diagnosis in the future for many of the same
reasons that have driven the sharp increases in drug, polygraph and
general medical testing in the workplace.3 8
In the end, market forces may be the single greatest factor motivat-
33 OTA 1990 REPORT, supra note 29, at 178, 183.
34 Brownlee & Silberner, The Assurances of Genes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,July 23, 1990,
at 57.
35 R. POKORSKI, THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING IN RISK CLASSIFICATION
(American Council of Life Ins. 1990). See Sit, Will Genetic Mapping Threaten Workers' Privacy?,
Boston Globe, Aug. 21, 1990, at 23, col. 1.
36 J. Payne, Working Group on Genetic Testing (Health Insurance Ass'n of Am. 1990).
3 7 OTA 1983 REPORT, supra note 29, at 36. The OTA found, however, that none of the
genetic tests evaluated at that time met established scientific criteria for routine use in an
occupational setting. OTA 1990 REPORT, supra note 29, at 8. The chasm in perception be-
tween the OTA and industry appears to be the employer's willingness to assume that if tests
are sufficiently reliable for clinical use, they can safely be used in occupational settings. See
Prediction and Prejudice: Forging a New Underclass, 55 CONSUMER REP. 483 (1990).
38 A comprehensive OTA report on testing in health insurance documents the substantial
rise in testing, including prospects for genetic testing. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S
CONG., MEDICAL TESTING AND HEALTH INSURANCE (1988) [hereinafter MEDICAL TESTING AND
HEALTH INSURANCE].
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ing genetic testing. Market researchers project that U.S. genetic test
sales will reach several hundred million dollars before the decade's
end. 9 The emergence of commercial interests in genetic test develop-
ment provides powerful incentives to lower the cost of genetic testing,
placing it within the reach of industry and insurance. If some insurers
or employers begin to make increasingly more sophisticated genetic
predictions, the pressure on others to utilize the same technology may
become irresistible.
If the marketplace itself is the only restraint on this technology's
proliferation, decreased prices and demonstrated cost-benefit advan-
tages will make widespread adoption inevitable. The need for legal
safeguards against genetic discrimination in employment and insurance
is apparent.
D. THE CURRENT PREVALENCE OF GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
No systematic studies of genetic discrimination in employment
and/or insurance settings have been undertaken. Professor Paul Bill-
ings and his colleagues did report twenty-nine cases of apparent ge-
netic discrimination based upon responses to an advertisement.
40
Other anecdotal reports of genetic discrimination have appeared in the
media.4' The 1982 OTA survey reported that of the eighteen compa-
nies taking some action on the basis of genetic testing, seven of them
transferred or dismissed the "at risk" employee. 42 The 1989 OTA sur-
vey reported very few instances of negative personnel decisions result-
ing from genetic monitoring or screening. Only two Fortune 500
companies reported ever rejecting a job applicant or transferring an
39 The commercial appeal of genetic testing is revealed in a staff background paper to the
OTA 1990 Report, supra note 29. M. Hewitt & N. Holtzman, The Commercial Development of
Tests for Human Genetic Disorders (Feb. 1988) (unpublished manuscript). This paper re-
views predictions of the market value of genetic tests from the following sources: ROBERT S.
FIRST, INC., GENETIC TESTING IN THE USA 1986-1990 (1986) ($550 million by 1990); Arthur D.
Little Projects a $5.7 Billion Clinical Diagnostic Market in 1990, GENETIC ENGINEERING NEWS, Mar.
1987, at 13 ($300 - $500 million by 1995); Disease Disposition Screening, BIOMEDICAL Bus. INT'L
230, 230-32 (1986) (U.S. current market value of genetic tests estimated at $210 million);
DNA Probes Nudge Monoclonals in the Race to Exploit the Medical Diagnostics Market, GENETIC ENGI-
NEERING NEWS, Sept. 1986, at 1, 12, 13, 21 ($500 million market value by 1993); Market for
DNA Probe Tests for Genetic Diseases, GENETIC TECH. NEWS, Nov. 1986, at 6-7 ($950 - $1000
million market value by 1992). More recently, Business Week predicted a $200 million-a-year
market for genetic tests being actively sought after by prominent bio-technology companies.
Carey, The Genetic Age, Bus. WEEK, May 28, 1990, at 68.
40 Billings, supra note 2, at 8.
41 See, e.g., MacDonald, Ethical Eye on Insurers' Genetic Tests, Daily Telegraph, July 15, 1990,
at 9 (describing an engineer who "was refused health or life insurance because he had
haemochromatosis - excessive absorption and storage of iron - despite having been treated
and declared fit by his doctor").
42 OTA 1983 REPORT, supra note 29, at 37.
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employee primarily or partly because of genetic test results. 43
Reported cases of genetic discrimination support the idea that ad-
verse decisions are often based upon mythologies and misconceptions
rather than real cost or safety concerns. Adverse decisions are based
on genetic status, rather than actual disability, lack of qualification or
accurate forecasting of future impairment. A common misconception
equates the presence of a genetic trait with actual disability, absent any
demonstrated nexus between current impairment and inability to meet
reasonable qualification standards. Genetic discrimination affects not
only heterozygotes (unaffected carriers) and "at risk" individuals (those
with a predisposition to disease), but also persons who are asymptom-
atic or have a minor form of the disease. For example, several cases of
discrimination were reported involving heterozygotes of sickle cell 4 or
Gaucher Disease.45 These genetic traits 46 may affect a future offspring,
but not the carrier herself. Discrimination against an unaffected carrier
is particularly pernicious because the condition is irrelevant to the per-
son's current or future health status or abilities. The discrimination is
based upon the mythology that a heterozygote has the disease or will
develop it.
"At risk" persons have a propensity to develop genetic disease
based upon a positive DNA test result or family history.4 7 Persons "at
risk" may be treated as though they are currently impaired with the
most severe form of the disease, even though there is great variability
in the onset and severity of symptoms. For example, discrimination
against persons with the marker for Huntington disease has occurred in
cases involving rejection by adoption agencies and rejection of life in-
surance coverage.48
Persons actually affected with genetic disease are often wrongly be-
43 OTA 1990 REPORT, supra note 29, at 182.
44 See Shapiro, Dangers of DNA: It Ain't Just Fingerprints, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 23, 1990, at 1 (quot-
ing Dr. Phillip Bereano) (" 'The Armed Forces for many years have followed a policy of ex-
cluding the carriers of sickle cell disease, despite the fact that these individuals are not
themselves impaired ......."); see also Matthewman, Title VII and Genetic Testing. Can Your Genes
Screen You Out of a Job?, 27 How. LJ. 1185, 1199 (1984); Raymann, Sickle Cell Trait and the
Aviator, 50 AVIATION SPACE & ENvTL. MED. 1170 (1979).
45 See, e.g., Billings, supra note 2, at 11 (man found to be an unaffected carrier of Gaucher
Disease was denied a government job because he was told he was a " 'carrier, like [of] sickle
cell.' ").
46 See T. DUSTER, supra note 12, at 41-42 ("trait" is a term normally applied to carriers of
autosomal dominant disorders; "the best known of these . . . are Tay-Sachs disease, beta-
thalassemia, sickle cell anemia, and cystic fibrosis").
47 See Shaw, Genetic Gains Raise Fear of a New Kind of Bias, Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 23,
1990, at I-A, col. 1 (describing the case of a Chicago woman, turned down for a job after her
prospective employer learned that her mother was schizophrenic; employer feared schizo-
phrenia was inherited).
48 Billings, supra note 2, at 13-14; Brownlee & Silberner, supra note 34, at 57.
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lieved to have severe symptoms, even if their impairments are relatively
minor. In the extreme case, discrimination has occurred against the
"healthy ill," those who test positive for a hereditary condition but are
asymptomatic. 49 In other cases, persons are discriminated against be-
cause of a genetic condition despite the fact that the symptoms do not
interfere with performance. Persons with Charcot-Marie-Tooth Dis-
ease (CMT), a hereditary motor-sensory neuropathy, 50 have been re-
jected from life, accident or automobile insurance even though very
mildly affected.5 One case of discrimination occurred despite a
favorable letter from the individual's personal physician and the ab-
sence of any record of past ill-health or accidents.5 2
Cost saving is the implicit goal in many cases of genetic discrimina-
tion. A decision to deny health or life insurance because of a diagnosis
of hemochromatosis,53 or a positive fetal DNA test for cystic fibrosis, 4
is based upon the belief that these individuals or their offspring could
burden health care and other benefit plans. Whether cost alone can
ever be a sufficient justification for genetic discrimination is a critical
public policy question.
III. LEGAL MECHANISMS TO REDRESS GENETIC
DISCRIMINATION
While discrimination based on individual status may be morally
wrong, it is not necessarily unlawful. Congress and state legislatures
have proscribed discrimination against classes based upon characteris-
tics including race, gender, religion, national origin, age and disabil-
ity.5 5 However, most jurisdictions do not have equivalent statutory
safeguards to protect against inequitable treatment based on other im-
mutable personal characteristics such as sexual orientation, height or
appearance. The key to determining the lawfulness of genetic discrimi-
nation under existing statutes is whether classification based upon ge-
netic characteristics is more akin to the categories of race, gender and
49 See, e.g., Billings, supra note 2, at 20-21 (reporting the case of a person with hereditary
hemochromatosis who, despite the absence of symptoms, was consistently denied insurance);
see also Brownlee & Silberner, supra note 34, at 57 (quoting Dr. Neil Holtzman).50 Griffin & Cornblath, Peripheral Neuropathies, in THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE, supra note 22, at 1092, 1095-96 (weakness, particularly footdrop, foot deformity
and hand weakness are the most severe manifestations of Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease
(CMT)).
51 Billings, supra note 2, at 10-11.
52 Id. at 10.
53 See MacDonald, supra note 41, at 9. Hemochromatosis is characterized by an excessive
absorption and storage of iron and can be controlled. See THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE, supra note 22, at 289, 862-63.
5 See Billings, supra note 2, at 18; see also supra note 25 for a description of this incident.
55 See infra notes 171-96 and accompanying text.
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disability, or the categories of sexual orientation, personality and intel-
ligence. Certainly, genetic discrimination, which disproportionately
burdens particular races, religions or genders, needs to be examined
under relevant civil rights legislation. Before examining that fertile
area of inquiry, this paper will discuss whether a genetic condition or
trait should be regarded as a disability.
A. THE APPLICABILITY OF DISABILITY LAW TO GENETIC
DISCRIMINATION
Three sources of disability law have emerged from federal, state
and municipal legislatures: the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
and other federal disability legislation,56 state and municipal handicap
laws, and genetic-specific laws. The Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA) is the most sweeping civil rights measure since the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.1 7 The ADA, unlike its predecessor, the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973,5" extends antidiscrimination protection of persons
with disabilities to private sector employment (Title I), public services
(Title III), public accommodations (Title III) and telecommunications
(Title IV).
State and municipal disability legislation are important supple-
ments to federal law. All states have disability statutes, all but four of
which prohibit discrimination in the private, as well as public sector.
59
Courts have held that state disability statutes closely follow the federal
civil rights approach and should be construed accordingly.6 ° State and
local disability laws are typically enforced by a network of experienced
human rights organizations that can be far more productive than courts
in preventing and remedying discrimination. These administrative
56 Federal legislation provides protection to persons with disabilities in several areas.
E.g., Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA), Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 773 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) (giving all school-aged chil-
dren with disabilities the right to a free public education in the least restrictive environment
appropriate to their needs) (note that in order to reflect progressive language Congress re-
named EAHCA the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Act of Oct. 30, 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1142); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430,
102 Stat. 1619 (codified, among other places, at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3614a (Supp. 1990)).
57 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1988)).
58 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1988)), survives the subsequent enactment of the ADA, and contin-
ues to be the prime legislation affecting persons with disabilities working for the federal gov-
ernment. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12209(a), (b) (West Supp. 1990) (Coverage of Congress and the
agencies of the Legislative Branch).
5 9 NATIONAL GAY RIGHTS ADVOCATES, PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION UNDER STATE
HANDICAP LAWS: A FIFTY STATE ANALYSIS (1989). See B. BRIDGHAM & M. ROWE, AIDS AND
DISCRIMINATION - A REVIEW OF STATE LAWS THAT AFFECT HIV INFECTIONS 1983-1988 (1989).
60 See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 212 Cal. App. 3d 1242,
261 Cal Rptr. 197 (1989).
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agencies initiate targeted education and use reconciliation effectively. 6
Many agencies report settling eighty percent or more of their cases
through these less costly and less adversarial methods.62 Because of
this existing regulatory network dedicated to education, factfinding and
alternative forms of dispute resolution, state and local disability legisla-
tion will continue to be important sources of law to prevent and remedy
genetic discrimination.
Reinforcing the importance of safeguarding persons from genetic
discrimination, a few states and municipalities have enacted specific
legislation. Some of these laws apply generally to hereditary disor-
ders,63 but most are directed to particular traits such as sickle cell, Tay-
Sachs or Cooley's Anemia.' Since most state and local legislatures
have thus far refrained from enacting genetic-specific anti-discrimina-
tion legislation,65 the primary source of law continues to be disability
law.
The legislative history of the ADA indicates that little attention was
given to genetic discrimination. Congressman Steny Hoyer, the Floor
Manager in the House, informed the Congressional Bioethics Advisory
Committee that genetic discrimination was "not raised or discussed,"
and that it could not, therefore, be addressed by the Conference Com-
66mittees. 6 Congressman Hoyer recognized that genetic discrimination
was "improper" and "very dangerous," but left it to the courts to de-
termine whether it was covered under the ADA.67 Nevertheless, sev-
eral Congressmen supported the argument that "the ADA will also
benefit individuals who are identified through genetic tests as being
carriers of a disease-associated gene."'6 ' These legislators referred to
the history of genetic discrimination, particularly during the sickle cell
61 The ADA also encourages "the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, includ-
ing settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and
arbitration." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12212 (West Supp. 1990).
62 R. STEELE, S. KARSTEN, B. LORENZ & J. RrITER, IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT OF
STATE AND LOCAL STRATEGIES TO PREVENT DISCRIMINATION (1989).
63 E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 150(f (West 1990) ("[c]arriers of most deleterious
genes should not be stigmatized and should not be discriminated against by any person").
64 E.g., 1990 N.Y. LAws 900 (persons with sickle cell trait and carriers of Tay-Sachs dis-
ease or Cooley's anemia may not be denied opportunities for employment unless their disor-
der would prevent them from performing the job).
65 Compare this restraint with the flood of HIV-specific anti-discrimination state legisla-
tion. See Gostin, The AIDS Litigation Project: A National Review of Court and Human Rights Commis-
sion Decisions, Part lI: Discrimination, 263J. A.M.A. 2086 (1990); GOSTIN, Public Health Strategies
for Confronting AIDS: Legislative and Regulatory Policy in the United States, 261 J. A.M.A. 1621
(1989) [hereinafter Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS].
66 Letter from Rep. Steny Hoyer to Alexander Capron, Chairman of the Biomedical Eth-
ics Advisory Committee 2 (Aug. 1, 1990) (on file with American Journal of Law & Medicine).
67 Id.
68 136 CONG. REC. H4614, 4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hawkins).
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screening programs in the 1970s.6 9
1. Defining a Disability
Disability is defined broadly in the ADA to mean: (A) "a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities... (B) a record of such impairment, or (C) being regarded
as having such an impairment." ' 70 "Physical or mental impairment" in-
cludes the following: any physiological disorder or condition, disfig-
urement or anatomical loss affecting any of the major bodily systems,
or any mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation,
mental illness or dementia.7'
A person is disabled if he or she has a "record" of or is "regarded"
as being disabled, or is perceived to be disabled, even if there is no
actual incapacity. 72 A "record" indicates that the person has a history
of impairment, or has been misclassified as having an impairment. 73
This provision is designed to protect persons who have recovered from
a disability or disease which previously impaired their life activities. By
including those who have a record of impairment, Congress acknowl-
edged that people who have recovered from diseases such as cancer, or
have diseases under control such as diabetes, face discrimination based
upon prejudice and irrational fear.74
Those "'regarded'" as being impaired include individuals who
have a covered impairment, but do not have limitations in their major
life functions and are treated as if they did have such limitations. 75 This
concept protects people who are discriminated against in the false be-
69 Id. at H4624 (statement of Rep. Don Edwards); id. at 4626 (statement of Rep. Henry
Waxman).
70 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West Supp. 1990). "The term physical or mental impairment
does not include simple physical characteristics, such as blue eyes or black hair.... [nor does
it include] environmental, cultural, and economic disadvantages" in and of themselves. S.
REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989). The question may arise as to why genetic
traits for sickle cell or cystic fibrosis ought to be covered in the ADA, but not the genetic
determinants for blue eyes or black hair. The reason is simply that Congress has designated
disability, but not general personal characteristics, under civil rights. Id.
71 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West Supp. 1990). The definition of disability in the ADA is
comparable to the term "handicap" in older legislation. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(7)(B) (1988); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 45 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (Supp.
1990). Congress intended that regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act and the Fair
Housing Amendments Act apply to the term "disability" in the ADA. The use of the term
"disability" instead of "handicap" represents currently acceptable terminology. See S. REP.
No. 116, supra note 70, at 21.
72 See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) ("[a]n other-
wise qualified individual is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of
his handicap").
73 S. REP. No. 116, supra note 70, at 23.
74 Id.
75 Id. See School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
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lief that they are disabled. This provision is particularly important for
individuals who are perceived to have stigmatic conditions that are
viewed negatively by society. It is society's reaction, rather than the
disability itself, that deprives the person of equal enjoyment of rights
and services.
2. Current Genetic Disability
Persons currently disabled by a genetic disease are undoubtedly
covered under the ADA. The legislative history of the Act, as well as
prior case law, make clear that disability is defined only according to the
degree of impairment of life functions. No distinction can be drawn
between genetic and other causes of disabilities. Congress and the
courts have recognized disabilities of both genetic (Down syndrome,76
muscular dystrophy,17 cystic fibrosis 78 ) and multifactorial (heart dis-
ease, schizophrenia, epilepsy, diabetes and arthritis) 79 origin. The
question for courts is limited to whether the person is currently dis-
abled. How she came to be disabled is irrelevant.
In defining disability, the courts require a "substantial" limitation
of one or more major life activities. A genetic condition which does not
cause substantial impairment may not constitute a disability.80 If a per-
son with neurofibromatosis, for example, has only mild pigmentation
changes she may not be disabled, but if she suffers from gross disfigure-
ment she most assuredly would be protected under the ADA. 8' Citing
the example of cosmetic disfigurement, the Supreme Court said that
76 See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 648 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)
(clearly characterizing Down syndrome as a protected handicap). The Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources drew attention to a "New Jersey zoo keeper who refused to
admit children with Downs Syndrome because he feared they would upset the chimpanzees."
S. REP. No. 116, supra note 70, at 7.
77 S. REP. No. 116, supra note 70, at 22.
78 Id. ("a person with lung disease will have a substantial limitation in the major life
activity of breathing"). See Gerben v. Holsclaw, 692 F. Supp. 557, 563 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (cystic
fibrosis is "clearly" a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Department of Educ. v.
Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517, 519 (D. Haw. 1982) (cystic fibrosis is a handicap under the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975).
79 S. REP. No. 116, supra note 70, at 7, 22, 24. The Arline court quoted Senator Mondale's
discussion of a woman "crippled by arthritis," who was denied a job simply because college
trustees thought " 'normal students shouldn't see her,' " not because she could not do the
work. Arline, 480 U.S. at 283 (citing 118 CONG. REC. 36761 (1972)). See Doe v. Region 13
Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983) (mental illness
qualifies as a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
80 E.g., Arline, 480 U.S. at 273. Persons with minor or trivial impairments, such as a sim-
ple infected finger, are not disabled within the meaning of the Act. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 152, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 426, 435.
However, if a defendant discriminates because she regards or perceives the genetic condition
as more serious than it actually is, the person is protected under the third prong of the defini-
tion. See supra text accompanying note 71.
81 Cf S. REP. No. 116, supra note 70, at 24 (citing the example of a severe burn victim as a
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Congress was just as concerned about the effects of impairment on
others as it was about its effects on afflicted individuals.8 2
3. Future or Predicted Disability (presymptomatic)
Genetic diagnosis or prognosis creates a new category of individu-
als who are asymptomatic but predicted to develop disease in the fu-
ture. These individuals are sometimes referred to as the "healthy ill"
or "at risk." 83 The number of people currently in this category is small
since the technology is new and has only been applied to relatively rare
diseases such as Huntington chorea. Progress in DNA technology will
undoubtedly increase the range of diseases that can be detected before
symptoms appear, and thus increase such categorization.
Can a person who is currently healthy but predicted to become ill
be classified as "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA? Law, ethics
and public policy suggest that such a person should receive the same
protection as the currently disabled. The ADA expressly protects not
only individuals who are actually disabled but those who are "re-
garded" as or perceived to be disabled. 84 The law, therefore, does not
objectively measure actual abilities or disabilities of the person.
Rather, it judges disability through the subjective perceptions,
prejudices and stereotypes as expressed by the source of the discrimi-
nation. Those who discriminate because of subjective and uncertain
predictions of future impairment foster harmful stereotypes because
the person is currently healthy and capable of meeting all job, benefit
or service criteria. No sound judgment can be made regarding
whether, when and to what extent the person will lose capabilities or
whether reasonable accommodation could be provided. It would be in-
equitable for a defendant who intended to discriminate on the basis of
disability to successfully raise the defense that the person was not cur-
rently disabled. A narrow construction of the terms " 'regarded' to be
disabled" would yield an anomalous result. Persons with genetic con-
ditions would be required to wait until they actually develop symptoms
before becoming eligible for protection.
Congressional intent to include future disability within the scope
disabled person under the ADA). Technically, the effects of one's disfigurement on others
could be classified under the third prong of the definition. See id.
8 2 Arline, 480 U.S. at 282. While the Arline court was concentrating on infectious disease,
its conclusion is equally applicable to genetic discrimination: "It would be unfair to allow an
employer to seize upon the distinction between the effects of the disease on others and the
effects of a disease on a patient, and use that distinction to justify discriminatory treatment."
Id. at 282.
83 See Human Genetics Committee of the Council for Responsible Genetics, Position Paper
on Genetic Discrimination, GENEWATCH, May 1990, at 3. See also supra notes 47-49 and accompa-
nying text.
8442 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(c) (West Supp. 1990).
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of the ADA is reflected in the Act's legislative history and is consistent
with prior case law.85 During the Conference Report debate on the
ADA, Congressman Hawkins opined that persons who are genetically
at risk "may not be discriminated against simply because they may not
be qualified for a job sometime in the future. The determination as to
whether an individual is qualified must take place at the time of the
employment decision, and may not be based on speculation regarding
the future. ' 8 6 Several Congressmen concurred, indicating that persons
with future propensities toward disability are "regarded" as disabled.8 7
Case law concerning the federal Rehabilitation Act and state disa-
bility statutes also suggests that it is unlawful to discriminate on the
basis of future disability.8" One court observed that it would be "ironic
and insidious" if current disabilities were protected but the same pro-
tection were denied to those whom employers perceive to be predis-
posed to future disability.8 9 The New York Court of Appeals held that
obesity is a handicap even though it causes no current disability. The
court aptly observed that "disabilities, particularly resulting from dis-
ease, often develop gradually . . . An employer cannot deny employ-
ment simply because the condition has been detected before it has
actually begun to produce deleterious effects."9 An employer also
may not point to future safety risks as grounds for dismissal. 9 '
The analogy of asymptomatic HIV infection is helpful in ascertain-
ing a court's likely position on persons at risk for genetic disease. A
positive test for HIV infection is a powerful predictor of future disease
and disability. In 1986, the Justice Department concluded that while
the disabling effects of AIDS may constitute a handicap, pure asymp-
tomatic infection did not.92 The original Justice Department position
85 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
86 136 CONG. REC. H4614, 4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990).
87 Id. at 4626 (statement of Rep. Waxman). See also id. at 4624 (statement of Rep.
Edwards).
88 See Neeld v. American Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (concern for
future harm to player with one eye); Kimmel v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 23 Wash. App. 78,
596 P.2d 1069 (1979) (knee injuries suggested future harm); Dairy Equip. Co. v. Department
of Indus., 95 Wis. 2d 319, 290 N.W.2d 330 (1980) (employer feared an exacerbated future
injury from a fall because employee had only one kidney). But see Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz
Brewery Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979) (disability refers to present, non-correcta-
ble loss of vision, not potentially disabling conditions, so that correctable glaucoma was not a
handicap under the state statute).
89 Dairy Equip. Co., 95 Wis. 2d at 331, 290 N.W.2d at 335 (employee who had only one
kidney was "handicapped" within the meaning of the state Fair Employment Act).
90 State Div. of Hum. Rts. v. Xerox Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 213, 219, 480 N.E.2d 695, 698, 491
N.Y.S.2d 106, 109 (1985).
91 See Kimmel, 23 Wash. App. at 78, 596 P.2d at 1069 (knee injury that might pose future
safety risk at sea).
92 Opinion of Charles J. Cooper, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, for
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has been thoroughly repudiated by Congress and the courts.93 Both
the legislative94 and judicial9" branches have made clear that pure
asymptomatic infection is protected under disability law.
It is difficult to distinguish between a predictive test for AIDS and
one for Huntington disease. In both cases there are no current symp-
toms, the predictive values of the tests are strong, and onset and sever-
ity are uncertain. Employers might argue that persons who test positive
for HIV have a current infection manifesting a clear disease process,
while persons testing positive for Huntington disease do not. This is
not a convincing argument. A defect in a specific chromosome can be
identified as the beginning of a genetic disease process in the same way
as infection is identified as the beginning of a contagious disease pro-
cess. Public policy would be skewed if it left individuals unprotected
while free of symptoms and protected them only after they developed
symptoms. 6 Courts are unlikely to accept this construction of the
ADA.
4. Genetic Carriers
Carriers of recessive genetic diseases such as hemoglobin disor-
ders (sickle cell and thalassemia) and Tay-Sachs have only one gene
that influences the disease, whereas two genes are required in order to
manifest the disease. A carrier will not develop symptoms, but her off-
spring may inherit the disease if her partner is also a carrier. Employ-
ers, insurers or health care providers may discriminate against carriers
because of a fundamental misconception that a recessive gene might
affect a person's own health or capabilities. 9 7
The ADA's prohibition of discrimination based upon a perception
of disability applies to those who falsely assume that carriers are, or will
become, disabled.9" The primary purpose of disability law is to over-
come such irrational fears and beliefs. The courts have made clear, for
Ronald E. Robertson, General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services, June 23,
1986.
93 The Justice Department reversed its opinion in 1988. Memorandum for Arthur B.
Calvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President, from Douglas W. Kamiec, Acting Assistant Attor-
ney General, Office of Legal Counsel, re Application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
to HIV-Infected Individuals, Sept. 27, 1988.
94 See, e.g., Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No, 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 § 9
(codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(C) (West Supp. 1990)).
95 See, e.g., Doe v. Centinela Hosp., 57 U.S.L.W. 2034 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (asymptomatic
carrier of AIDS virus protected under Rehabilitation Act).
96 See Genetic Testing and the Americans with Disabilities Act, fact sheet accompanying
letter from Alexander Capron, Edmund Pelligrino and Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan to Sena-
tor Tom Harkin (June 25, 1990) (on file with American Journal of Law & Medicine).
97 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text for examples of discrimination against
heterozygotes.
98 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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example, that an unfounded fear of contracting an infectious disease is
not tolerated under the law.99 The case law shows a consensus that
employment decisions must be based upon reasonable medical judg-
ments showing that the disability prevents the individual from meeting
legitimate performance criteria.' 00
5. Multifactorial Diseases and Environmental Factors
The social impact of genetic diagnosis and prognosis is felt
strongly in the occupational setting. The identification of persons who
are hypersusceptible to occupational disease provides a possible health
justification for employment discrimination. These persons are pro-
tected under the ADA provided the employer's decision is based on a
perception that the person is, or will become, disabled.'' A federal
district court, for example, held that a person who is unusually sensitive
to tobacco smoke is handicapped under the federal Rehabilitation Act
of 1973.102 The court reasoned that this hypersensitivity limited one of
the employee's major life activities, his capacity to work in an environ-
ment which is not completely smoke-free.' 0 3 Similarly, a sportsperson
may be disabled if she has a weak heart10 4 or poor eyesight,'0 5 both of
which make her susceptible to future harm or injury, and a firefighter
may be disabled if the stresses of the job would provoke a sickle cell
crisis.
10 6
The promise of the ADA is to protect individuals who are, or are
perceived to be, disabled in the past, present or potentially in the fu-
ture. It would be a betrayal of that promise if the law "did not equally
protect individuals who are not, and indeed, may never be disabled, but
whose predictive genetic tests cast a shadow over their own future
health or that of their children."'' 0 7
99 See School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) ("society's
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physi-
cal limitations that flow from actual impairment").
100 See Burris, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 VILL. L. REV. 933,978-81
(1989); Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 461, 467 (1987).
101 See supra text accompanying note 75 (discussing individuals "regarded" as disabled).
102 Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
103 Id. at 87.
104 Dodd, Who Decides Health Risk is Too High?, USA Today, Oct. 5, 1990, at Cl, col. 1.
105 See Neeld v. American Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (denial of
plaintiff with sight in only one eye an opportunity to play professional hockey would result in
irreparable harm).
106 See, e.g., Peoples v. City of Salina, Kan., No. 88-4280-S, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4070
(D. Kan. March 20, 1990). Employers, however, can take action if the person's condition
renders him unqualified for the job or would pose a direct threat to others in the workplace.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(3) (West Supp. 1990).
107 Letter from Nachama L. Wilker & Ruth Hubbard, Council for Responsible Genetics,
to Rep. Steny Hoyer (June 27, 1990) (on file with American Journal of Law & Medicine).
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1
B. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER DISABILITY LAW
1. "Qualification Standards," Including "Direct Threat"
The anti-discrimination principle in the ADA applies only to "qual-
ified individuals."' 1°8 A "qualified" person must be capable of meeting
all of the performance or eligibility criteria for the particular position,
service or benefit.' °9 ADA qualification standards may include a re-
quirement that an individual not pose a "direct threat" to health or
safety in the workplace." 0 There is, moreover, an affirmative obliga-
tion to provide "reasonable accommodations"'' or "reasonable modi-
fications""' 2 if they would enable the person to meet performance or
eligibility criteria. Employers are not required to provide reasonable
accommodations if such provision would pose an undue hardship on
the operation of the business.' 3
How do such terms as "qualified," "direct threat," "reasonable ac-
commodation" and "undue hardship" apply to discrimination based
upon a genetic prediction of future disability of the employee or her
offspring? Qualification standards are measured against current skills
and performance. The fact that a person may become unqualified
sometime in the future does not justify discrimination. As noted by
Representative Waxman and others throughout the legislative process
on the ADA, "[t]he determination as to whether a person is qualified
must be made, however, at the time of the particular employment deci-
sion - of hiring, firing, promotion, and so forth - and may not be
based upon speculation and predictions regarding the person's ability
to be qualified for the job in the future.""' 4
Congress, however, was acutely aware of the potential risks dis-
abled persons pose to the health and safety of others in the work-
place."' 5 Although the "direct threat" criterion was limited to persons
10842 U.S.C.A. §§ 12112(a), 12132 (West Supp. 1990).
109 Title I requires qualification standards, employment tests, or other selection criteria
to be "job-related" and "consistent with business necessity." Id. at § 12112(b)(b). Title II
requires the -disabled person to meet the "essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
services or the participation in programs or activities." Id. at § 12131(2).
110 Id. at § 12113(b). "Direct threat" means "a significant risk to the health or safety of
others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." Id. at § 12111(3).
111 Id. at § 12112(b)(5).
1'2 1d, at § 12131(2).
113 id. at § 12112(b)(5)(A). See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
410, 412 (1979) (this exception requires "fundamental alteration in the nature of the pro-
gram" or "undue financial and administrative burdens"). "Undue hardship" is carefully de-
fined as "requiring significant difficulty or expense" when considered in light of many
enumerated factors. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(10)(A).
114 136 CONG. REC. H4614, 4626 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
See also id. at 4614 (statement of Rep. Hawkins).
115 See, e.g. ,Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference para. 2 ("direct
threat") and para. 13 ("health and safety"); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 70, at 27.
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with contagious disease in the Senate Bill, it was extended in Confer-
ence to all individuals with disabilities. 1 6 The ADA does not override
pre-existing medical standards or requirements for workplace safety
mandated by federal, state or local law." 7 Employers may also estab-
lish legitimate medical standards."'
Since occupational health and safety concerns are incorporated
within qualification standards, they must primarily be determined by
actual workplace risks and not speculation about risks which are theo-
retical, remote or distant.'19 The courts, however, are likely to uphold
decisions to protect employees from foreseeable risks in the immediate
future, particularly for safety or security sensitive positions.' 2 ° For ex-
ample, clear medical evidence demonstrating a likelihood of harm or
injury may disqualify a person from an inherently risky position such as
an airline pilot, a police officer or a firefighter.
12 1
The ADA's explicit language refers to significant risks to the health
or safety of other individuals in the workplace.'2 ' Thus, current or fore-
seeable health and safety risks define the parameters of genetic discrim-
ination. Occupational risks must be significant. The determination of
significant risk must be based upon scientific evidence.' 23 Disability
law has been thoughtfully crafted to replace reflexive actions based
upon irrational fears, speculation, stereotypes or pernicious mytholo-
gies, with carefully reasoned judgments based upon well established
scientific information.' 24 Significant risk must therefore be determined
on a case by case basis, and not under any type of blanket rule, general-
ization about a class of disabled persons, or assumptions about the na-
ture of disease. This requires a fact-specific individualized inquiry such
that a "well-informed judgment grounded in a careful and open-
minded weighing of risks and alternatives" results. 125 A specific deter-
1 16 H.R. REP. No. 596, supra note 80, at pt. 3, 11, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 566. In the House, the standard of "direct threat" was extended by the
Judiciary Committee to all individuals with disabilities, and not simply those with contagious
diseases or infections. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 80, pt. 3, at 34, reprinted in 1990 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 457.
117 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, para. 10 ("pre-employ-
ment inquiries").
11842 U.S.C.A. §§ 12112(c)(3), 12113(b) (West Supp. 1990).
119 Id. at § 12113(b) ("Qualification standards").
120 See School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987).
121 See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, para. 10.
12242 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111(3), 12113(b).
123 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 80, at pt. 2, 56-57, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, at 339.
124 The legislative record is replete with statements rejecting decision-making based
upon ignorance, misconceptions and patronizing attitudes. See, e.g., id., pt. 2, at 7, 121; id., pt.
3, at 52, 153; id., pt. 4, at 38; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 70, at 27.
125 Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting
School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 772 F.2d 759, 764-65 (11 th Cir. 1985)). See also
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mination must be made that a person with a genetic pre-disposition will
develop symptoms in the immediate future that represent a real threat
to health or safety in the workplace.
The language of the ADA refers to the risk to "other individuals"
in the "workplace." Strictly construing the Act, courts might disregard
risks to the health of the disabled person. Thus, disabled persons may
argue that they cannot be discriminated against merely because they
are hypersusceptible to workplace toxins or because they pose a safety
risk to themselves. However, courts adopting a broader view of the Act
may disqualify disabled persons if occupational exposure poses a signif-
icant and immediate threat to their health. Courts are not likely to
overturn employers' decisions to terminate employees to avoid an im-
mediate sickle cell crisis 126 or to avoid a likely heartattack or a physical
injury to a vulnerable sportsperson. t 27 Whether or not a well docu-
mented and serious longer-term risk of cancer would justify discrimina-
tion remains to be decided. t2  The courts, however, would comply
with the letter and spirit of the ADA if they did not allow discrimination
based upon cumulative exposure to workplace toxins over many years.
Such discrimination could motivate widespread genetic discrimination.
As suggested earlier, this would also provide an excuse for employers
to weed out hypersusceptible workers rather than reduce overall toxic
levels.' 2 9
The reference in the ADA to the risk to others in the "workplace"
raises the question of whether employers can discriminate based upon
risks to future offspring. The language would not permit discrimina-
tion against genetic carriers since the risk to the fetus does not arise
from the workplace environment. Risks of teratogenicity to the em-
ployee or congenital risks to the fetus in the womb stemming from oc-
cupational exposure may present closer jurisprudential and ethical
questions. This form of discrimination is more likely to be directed
against women rather than disabled persons, so it will be discussed
under gender discrimination below.'
30
Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985); Strathe v. Department of Transp., 716
F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
12 6 See Peoples v. City of Salina, Kan., No. 88-4280-S, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4070 (D.
Kan. Mar. 20, 1990).
127 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
128 See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986) (whether an
individual exposed to asbestos but not currently symptomatic can recover today for the likeli-
hood of future cancer).
129 See supra text accompanying notes 101-06.
I0 Fetal protection policies involve excluding women from the workplace because of po-
tential harms to the fetus. This sets up an express class based upon gender. See, e.g., Interna-
tional Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 1991 US
LEXIS 1715.
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2. "Reasonable Accommodations" and "Undue Hardship"
To enable a disabled person to meet qualification standards, the
employer has an affirmative obligation to provide reasonable accommo-
dations, including the reduction of significant risks to health or
safety.' While the ADA primarily addresses physical barriers to ac-
cess, it also requires that workplace environments be "usable" by indi-
viduals with disabilities.' 3 2 This could include reducing environmental
hazards to which the disabled person is hypersusceptible. One federal
district court assumed that this would include marked reductions in to-
bacco smoke to accommodate an employee who was hypersensitive, but
did not require providing a smoke-free environment. 33
The ADA requires reasonable accommodations unless they would
impose an "undue hardship" on the operation of the business.' 34 Un-
due hardship means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense
when considered against such factors as the nature and cost of the ac-
commodation and the overall financial resources and size of the busi-
ness.' 35 Employers do not have to provide accommodations that would
fundamentally alter the nature of the industry.' 36 For example, a com-
pany need not stop producing batteries to eliminate lead levels.' 3 7 Em-
ployers that can improve workplace environments without undue
financial burden may be required to do so.
3. Pre-employment Genetic Testing and Prognosis
The ADA's prohibition of discrimination against persons with disa-
bilities also applies to medical examinations and inquiries.'3 8 Histori-
cally, employers gathered information concerning the applicant's
physical and mental condition through application forms, interviews
and medical examinations.' 39 This information was often used to ex-
clude disabled persons from employment, particularly applicants with
hidden disabilities such as epilepsy, emotional illness, cancer or HIV
infection.' 40 The employer's ability to systematically obtain and use
"'142 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111(3), (9), 12112(b)(5) (West Supp. 1990).
"
2 1d, at § 12111(9)(A).
'3 Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
13442 U.S.C.A. § 12111(10) (West Supp. 1990).
135 id. at § 12111 (10)(B). Congress explicitly rejected the implication of the Supreme
Court in TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), that an employer need not expend more than a
de minimis amount for the accommodations. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 70, at 36.
136 S. REP. No. 116, supra note 70, at 35.
137 See, e.g., International Union, UAW v.Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989),
rev'd, 1991 US LEXIS 1715; see also supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
138 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(7), (8) (West Supp. 1990).
139 See Rothstein, supra note 15, at 1409-21.
140 See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 70, at 39.
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medical information to predict hidden conditions expands with the de-
velopment of genetic testing and prognosis.
Discrimination against persons with hidden disabilities has been
unlawful since the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Enforcement, however,
has been exceedingly difficult, since an employer need not disclose that
the person's medical condition was the prime reason for the failure to
hire. So long as employers were able to conduct extensive medical ex-
aminations before offering a job, they could effectively hide the true
reason for the employment decision.
The ADA prohibits employers from conducting pre-offer medical
inquiries. 14 ' Section 12112(c)(4)(a) prohibits employers from con-
ducting medical examinations or inquiries to determine a job appli-
cant's disabilities. Pre-employment inquiries must be limited to
assessing the applicant's ability to perform job-related functions.'4 2
Thus, employers may not require job applicants to undergo extensive
medical examinations and screenings, including diagnosis and progno-
sis for genetic traits or conditions. This will strictly limit the employer's
ability to obtain information about a person's current and future ill-
ness, diseases or genetic pre-dispositions before a job is offered.
The ADA permits an employer to require an entrance examination
only after an offer of employment has been made, provided all entering
employees are subjected to the same examination and the medical in-
formation is kept strictly confidential. 143 Employers are also limited in
their right to conduct medical examinations or inquiries after a person
is hired. The employer cannot compel an employee to take a medical
examination or inquire as to whether the employee is disabled unless
the examination or inquiry is job related and consistent with business
necessity.' 44 Congress, in enacting the ADA, recognized that "[a]n in-
quiry or medical examination that is not job-related serves no legiti-
mate employer purpose, but simply serves to stigmatize the persons
with a disability."' 4 5 The ADA will significantly impede the growing
use of medical testing and information gathering used by employers
across America, thus transforming the way the business community
makes hiring decisions.
141 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1990). For the purposes of the ADA, drug
testing is not considered a medical examination, and employers are not prohibited from tak-
ing action against a person who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs. Id. at
§ 12114(d)(1).
142Mld. at § 12112(c)(1), (4)(A).
143 Id. at § 12112(c)(3)(A)-(C).
144 Id. at § 12112(c)(4)(A).
145 S. REP. No. 116, supra note 70, at 39.
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4. Employer Costs: Health, Disability, Life and Other Insurance
Benefits
14 6
Employers utilizing genetic testing cite cost benefit and greater
productivity as the main reasons. 14 7 Employers' costs for health care
and other benefits have risen substantially in recent years.' 48 These
costs are borne directly by employers with larger work forces, many of
whom tend to be self-insurers or have experience rating. Alternatively,
increased benefits costs are passed on from insurance companies to
employers in the form of higher premiums.
14 9
Some astute commentators on disability law give considerable
credence to employer decisions not to hire persons with current or fu-
ture disabilities based upon probable costs to health, disability, life and
other insurance benefits. "If a worker will become ill, and if the em-
ployer will be responsible for the medical costs as well as the output
costs of the worker's absence, then the predicted illness is nothing but a
future dollar cost that the employer must consider and discount."'
' 50
The legislative and judicial consensus contradicts that of industry,
holding financial burdens on employee benefit programs insufficient to
146 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) may provide an
additional source of law to remedy discrimination based purely on cost factors. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1988). Section 510 of ERISA makes it unlawful for an employer to
"discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is
entitled under the provisions of any employer benefit plan. . . or any right to which such
participant may become entitled under [such benefit] .. .plan." Id. at § 1140.
ERISA allows a participant or beneficiary to bring a civil action in order to recover
benefits due him or clarify or enforce his rights under the plan. Id. at § 1132(a)(l)(B). The
term participant refers to an "employee or former employee of an employer, or any member
or former member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive
benefits." Id. at § 1002(7). A beneficiary is "a person designated by a participant, or by the
terms of an employee benefit plan." Id. at § 1002(8). Apparently, one can only become a
participant and thus eligible (through the automatic operation of a benefit plan or through
self-selection) to designate beneficiaries, once one is hired. Indeed, courts have thus far
restricted entitlement under ERISA to current or discharged employees. See Liebman, supra
note 1, at 87-88. Thus, ERISA may provide a remedy for persons with genetic conditions or
pre-dispositions once they are hired.
While ERISA does not require employers to provide benefit plans at all, it does prohibit
employers from discriminating against employees because they may disproportionately
burden a benefit plan now or in the future. See Folz v. Marriot Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007,
1014-15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (discharge of an employee after revelation to employer that the
employee suffered from multiple sclerosis and where no complaints of employee's job
performance existed, violated ERISA); see also Vogel, Containing Medical and Disability Costs by
Cutting Unhealthy Employees: Does Section 510 of ERISA Provide a Remedy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1024, 1028-29, 1029 n.29 (1987).
147 OTA 1990 REPORT, supra note 29, at 181-82.
148 See generally Liebman, supra note 1, at 84-85; Vogel, supra note 146, at 1024 & n.l,
1029-39 (1987).
149 See Vogel, supra note 146, at 1028-29.
150 Liebman, supra note 1, at 82.
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justify discrimination.' The Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee echoed this theme throughout the legislative process: "an
employer may not refuse to hire an individual because of fears regard-
ing increased insurance costs attendant on hiring the individual -
either because of increased costs to be incurred because of that individ-
ual's health needs or because of the health needs of that individual's
family."152
Disability law is concerned only with the relationship between a
person's disability and her ability to perform the job she seeks. The
fact that the person may have an undesirable impact on disability, life
or health insurance programs is irrelevant.' The courts have also re-
jected as justifications for discrimination a wide array of business or
economic interests such as picketing the establishment,' 5 4 a threat of
violence against workers,' 55 adverse publicity' 5 6 and loss of clien-
tele. ' 5 7 Courts reject cost as an excuse for discrimination because anti-
discrimination has a higher social value than strictly economic business
interests. Allowing such cost considerations to prevail could erode the
protections currently conferred by disability law. 158
People with genetic traits, conditions or pre-dispositions should
not be denied ajob or promotion based upon their perceived or future
disabilities, and they should have equal access to health and other in-
surance coverage provided to all employees. Employers, however, may
circumvent anti-discrimination principles 'when they are self-insur-
ers.' 5 9 In such cases they may be judged as if they were underwriting
risks, rather than making employment decisions. Agencies required to
promulgate regulations under the ADA should carefully consider the
interaction of unlawful employment decisions with lawful underwriting
decisions, to ensure that the latter are not used to circumvent the over-
riding anti-discrimination principles under the Act.
151 See generally S. REP. No. 116, supra note 70.
152 136 CONG. REC. H4614, 4627 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
153 See State Div. of Hum. Rts. v. Xerox Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 213, 219, 480 N.E.2d 695, 697-
98, 491 N.Y.S.2d 106, 108, (1985); Shawn v. Legs Co. Partnership, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., AIDS
Lit. Rptr., March 10, 1989.
154 Mosby v. Joe's Westlake Restaurant, No. 86-5045 (Cal Super. Ct., San Francisco
County).
155 Cronan v. New Eng. Tel., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273 (Mass. 1986).
156 Shannon v. Charter Red Hosp., Admin. Complaint, Dallas, Tex., April 28, 1986.
15 7 Shawn, Sup. Ct. NY, AIDS Lit. Rptr., March 10, 1989.
158 Representative Owens stated: "Allowing the fact of such increased costs to justify
employment discrimination would effectively gut the protections of the ADA for individuals
with disabilities." 136 CONG. REC. H4614, 4623 (daily ed. July 13, 1990).
159 ERISA pre-empts state laws that "relate to any employee benefit plans," except state
laws regulating insurance. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), (b)(2) (1988). Employers who self-insure can
avoid these state laws. See Vogel, supra note 146, at 1028 & n.24.
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C. INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION UNDER DISABILITY LAW
Congress intended to afford to insurers, employers and health care
providers the same opportunities to design and administer insurance
products and benefit plans in a manner that is consistent with the basic
principles of underwriting, classifying and administering risks they
would enjoy in the absence of the ADA." 6 Thus, insurers may con-
tinue to sell to and underwrite individuals applying for life, health or
other insurance;' 6 ' and employers and their agents may establish and
observe the terms of employee benefit plans based upon sound actua-
rial data. 16
2
It is, therefore, apparent that the ADA does not restrict insurers,
health care providers or other benefit plan administrators from carry-
ing on their normal underwriting activities. This includes the use of
pre-existing condition clauses in health insurance contracts, the placing
of caps or other limits on coverage for certain procedures or treatments
or the charging of a higher premium to persons with higher risks.
163
The adverse impact of underwriting for persons with genetic pre-
dispositions is significant. If insurers have actuarial data demonstrating
a likelihood of future illness, they can limit coverage. More worrisome
would be a decision by an insurer to view a genetic predisposition as a
pre-existing condition. The greater genetic tests' predictive value, the
more likely it is that insurers will regard the condition as uninsurable or
pre-existing. This process is illuminated by the reaction of insurance
160 H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 80, pt. 2, at 136-38, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS, at 419-21.
161 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (West Supp. 1990).
162 The Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) regulates employee bene-
fits (including self-insured plans), effectively preempting the states, and specifically leaves in-
surance regulation to the states. Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724
(1985). ERISA's exemption of self-insured plans from state insurance regulation is not af-
fected by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 80, pt. 3, at
137, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, at 420 ("Concerns had been raised
that [portions of the ADA] could be interpreted as affection [sic] the preemption provision of
ERISA. No such implication is intended."). The problem with ERISA's preemption provision
is that self-insured plans cannot be required by states to provide certain benefits or to contrib-
ute to risk pools. Since an estimated 60% of all covered workers are under self-insured plans,
a significant limitation is placed on the states that seek to rectify inequitable coverage. MEDI-
CAL TESTING AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 38, at 114.
163 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 116, supra note 70, at 29 ("The ADA does not, however, affect
pre-existing condition clauses included in insurance policies offered by employers .... so
long as such clauses are not used as subterfuge to evade the purposes of this legislation.").
Nor can employee benefit plans be found to violate the ADA under impact of every person
with a disability, for example, additional sick leave or medical coverage. "In sum,
[ § 12201(c)] is intended to afford to insurers and employers the same opportunities they
would enjoy in the absence of this legislation to design and administer insurance products and
benefit plans in a manner that is consistent with basic principles of insurance risk classifica-
tion." H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 80, pt. 2, at 137, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS, at 420-21. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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companies to HIV infection. As epidemiologic evidence demonstrated
the inexorable course of HIV infection, insurers began insisting on ac-
cess to serologic information. Now much of the industry conducts its
own HIV testing, and regards HIV infection as an uninsurable condi-
tion."6 Should genetic tests begin demonstrating the inevitability of
future illness, we can expect insurers to follow the same course.
The ADA's major limitation on insurers, including self-insurers, is
to prevent them from using underwriting as a subterfuge for invidious
discrimination.' 65 Congress intended a liberal construction of the
word "subterfuge," so that any evasion of the principles of anti-dis-
crimination, whether malicious, purposeful or inadvertent, will be un-
lawful.' 66 Thus, insurers cannot completely deny health coverage on
the basis of a genetic predisposition, and employers cannot deny a
qualified applicant a job either because the employer's insurance plan
does not cover the genetic disability or because of the increased
COSt. 167 The sharp distinction drawn by the ADA is that any discrimina-
tion among disabled applicants for insurance or employment must be
justified on the basis of actuarial data demonstrating a heightened risk
of future illness.
68
Whether one regards the ADA's exemption of underwriting as rea-
sonable or not depends upon how the insurance industry is viewed. If
the industry is regarded strictly as a business it is difficult to question
the ability to discriminate on the basis of sound actuarial data. The
very essence of underwriting is to classify people according to risk,
treating those with higher risks differently. From a business perspec-
tive, no rational distinction can be drawn between genetic prognosis
and smoking, hypertension, high serum cholesterol or HIV infection.
In each case, medical data can provide powerful predictions of future
health and longevity. Insurers also assert that access to genomic data is
required to prevent "adverse selection."'169 Perhaps the greatest fear
164 See generally MEDICAL TESTING AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 38.
16542 U.S.C.A. § 12201(c) (West Supp. 1990).
166 Congress rejected the Supreme Court's restrictive reading of the term "subterfuge"
in Public Employment Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989). The Court in
Betts held that subterfuge required some malicious or purposeful intent to evade. See 136
CONG. REC. H4614, 4623 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hawkins); id. at 4627
(statement of Rep. Waxman).
167 See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 80, pt. 2, at 82-83, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS, at 364-66; id., pt. 3, at 35-36, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS, at 457-59.
168 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(c)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
169 Adverse selection refers to "[tihe tendency of persons with poorer than average
health expectations to apply for or continue insurance to a greater extent than persons with
average or better health expectations." MEDICAL TESTING AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note
38, at vi.
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of insurers is that genetic testing will become common in clinical
medicine yet they will be barred from obtaining that information.
If, on the other hand, the health insurance industry is viewed as an
instrument of social policy, then the ADA's exemption of underwriting
becomes worrisome. The social purpose of insurance is to spread risk
across groups, enabling wider access to health care services. If health
insurance becomes unavailable or unaffordable to those who are most
likely to become ill, then the social purpose of insurance is thwarted.
Once the pool of applicants is a differentiated mass, and each per-
son's medical future can be predicted with specificity, the conceptual
foundations of the industry are inverted. It may not be too far in the
future before a person's genome becomes a template for a wide array of
diseases. If insurers choose to utilize genomic information to make
sound actuarial predictions of disease, the ADA will be, in all
probability, ineffective in placing any restrictions on the industry.
D. GENETIC DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE IMPACT ON RACE,
ETHNICITY OR GENDER
Genetic prognosis, by its very nature, often disproportionately im-
pacts vulnerable classes based on race, ethnicity, national origin or gen-
der. Sickle cell is associated with persons of African heritage, Tay-
Sachs and Gaucher's disease (adult form) with Ashkenazi Jews, and
Family Mediterranean Fever with Armenians.17 0 Risks of teratogenicity
or congenital risks to the fetus are often focused on women or pregnant
women, setting up a class based on gender.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964171 prohibits job discrimi-
nation based upon race or gender unless the discriminatory practiceis
related to job performance. Lack of discriminatory purpose is irrele-
vant.172 Sandra Day O'Connor explained that the intention behind Ti-
tle VII was "to prohibit an employer from singling out an employee by
race or sex for the purpose of imposing a greater burden or denying an
equal benefit because of a characteristic statistically identifiable with the
group but empirically false in many individual cases."'' 7
The outcome of Title VII lawsuits is often dependent upon
whether or not the racial or gender discrimination is intentional. If the
class is explicitly race- or gender-based, or if the discrimination is inten-
tional, the employer must prove its action is based upon a "bona fide
170 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text; see also T. DUSTER supra note 12, at 160-
62.
171 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-15 (1988).
172 See Smith v. Olin Chem. Corp., 555 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1977).
173 Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1108 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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occupational qualification." '1 74  Title VII also allows lawsuits based
upon the disparate impact of a facially neutral policy. Once discrimina-
tory effect is shown, the employer must only demonstrate that there
was "business necessity" for the employment practice.' 75
Surprisingly little court litigation has focused on the burden of ge-
netic testing on racial minorities or women.' 76 An immediate problem
is that a genetic prognosis represents a facially neutral policy which
does not expressly discriminate on the basis of race or gender. 177 It is
far more likely that Title VII litigation to remedy genetic discrimination
will be based upon disparate impact theory, that the genetic trait or
condition disqualifies proportionately more racial minorities or women.
1. Sickle Cell Classification: A Form of Race Discrimination?
Some courts have said in dicta that a job classification based upon
sickle cell anemia or trait 178 would create a disparate impact on African
Americans." 79 Yet no law suit has been successful under this theory. In
Smith v. Olin Chemical Corporation, an African American employee
brought a Title VII claim when he was fired due to current and future
174 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
175 Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin
Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). In 1989 the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff has
the ultimate burden of proof, and that the employer need not demonstrate that the chal-
lenged practice is "essential" or "indispensable" to show business necessity. Wards'Packing
Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Congress has been trying, so far unsuccessfully, to
repudiate the holding in Wards Cove.
176 Sickle cell lawsuits have been brought under many other theories which are not ger-
mane to employment discrimination. See Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1982)
(state prison officials' denial of treatment to persons with sickle cell anemia raises a constitu-
tional issue); Taylor v. Flint Osteopathic Hosp., 561 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (finding
against plaintiff who argued that black patients were discriminated against by being denied
reimbursement for "unnecessary" medical treatments especially helpful for typically black
problems); Ross v. Bounds, 373 F. Supp. 450 (E.D.N.C. 1974) (black inmates seeking injunc-
tive relief if they had sickle cell anemia or trait did not state a cognizable claim under the Civil
Rights Act).
177 See EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980) (African American em-
ployee sued under Title VII alleging that no-beard policy adversely impacted black workers
because of a skin condition particular to African Americans).
178 Sickle cell anemia ... is a devastating hereditary blood disorder, found almost
exclusively in black populations, that can be traced to a defect in a single gene. Ho-
mozygotes, who inherit two copies of the mutant gene from their parents, suffer from
painful, often life-threatening symptoms of sickle cell anemia. Heterozygotes, who
inherit one mutant and one normal gene, are considered to have sickle cell trait ....
[and] they show no clinical symptoms of sickle cell anemia.
D. SUZUKI & P. KNUDTSON, GENETHICS: THE CLASH BETWEEN THE NEW GENETICS AND HUMAN
VALUES 144 (1989).
179 See Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Hum. Rts., 118 R.I. 457, 374
A.2d 1022 (1977) (a sickle cell screen would clearly be discriminatory since no racial explana-
tion was possible). Cf. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 153 n.5 (1977) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (under the majority opinion the employer could exclude sickle cell-related disa-
bilities from its disability benefits plan and not violate Title VII).
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bone degeneration characteristic of sickle cell anemia. The Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected his claim that he was dismissed on account of his race,
stating that the category of "bone degeneration" was racially neutral.
The court also rejected arguments based upon disparate impact be-
cause of the "manifest job-relatedness of the requirement that a man-
ual laborer have a good back."' °
Employment decisions based upon sickle cell trait may well violate
Title VII. A class based upon sickle cell disproportionately impacts Af-
rican Americans. Since the existence of a genetic trait usually does not
indicate any current or future illness, it is difficult to conceive how em-
ployers would justify the discrimination as a business necessity.
2. Fetal Protection Policies: A Form of Gender Discrimination?
An employer's refusal to hire women of child-bearing age based
upon the risk of teratogenicity or harms to the fetus in utero from occu-
pational exposure may be easier to challenge because of a more direct
gender classification, and less obvious job relatedness. Fetal protection
policies, in one form or another, go back a long way. Earlier this cen-
tury, the Supreme Court upheld exclusion of women from hazardous
employment to protect the "future well-being of the race." 18' Since
that time, however, a series of federal statutes set standards for employ-
ers to reduce toxic levels and other hazards to both men and women.' 8'
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978183 amended Title VII to
clarify that the statute prohibits "discrimination [against working wo-
men] on the basis of their childbearing capacity."'18 4
The Supreme Court has just decided the question of whether fetal
protection policies are allowed under Title VII. In International Union,
UA W v. Johnson Controls,'8 5 the court held that sex-specific fetal protec-
tion policies are unlawful. The case concerned a battery manufacturer's
policy that barred any woman from working in ajob that exceeded pre-
set lead levels, unless she presented medical evidence of sterility.' 8 6
180 Smith v. Olin Chem. Corp., 555 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1977). See Peoples v. City of
Salina, Kan., No. 88-4280-S, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4070 (D. Kan. March 20, 1990) (rejecting
claim of racial discrimination when a firefighter with sickle cell anemia was dismissed because
of the heightened risk of sickle cell crisis; plaintiff was not qualified for the position).
181 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908).
182 See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 219 (1988); Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 - 687 (1988).
183 Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1988)).
184 Women affected in pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same as others who are "similar in their ability or inability to work." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(K) (1988).
185 International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 1991 US LEXIS 1715.
186 The pre-set levels were: (1) where any employee recorded a blood lead level exceed-
ing 30ug/dIl during the preceding year; or (2) the work site yielded an air sample during the
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The Seventh Circuit found no violation of Title VII. 187 It reasoned that
the fetal protection policy constituted a gender-neutral rule which had
a disparate impact on a protected group.' The policy was justified by
the "business necessity" of preventing a "substantial health risk" to the
children of female, but not male, workers.
189
The Supreme Court found that Johnson Controls' fetal protection
policy constituted facial discrimination, as it applied to female employ-
ees, but not to male employees.' 9 0 Such a policy could be justified only
if sex were shown to be a "bona fide occupational qualification.' 9 '
The Court noted that the BFOQ defense is a narrow one, and that the
legislative history and case law forbid discrimination against a woman
because of her ability to become pregnant unless it interferes with her
job performance. 19 2
The Court also addressed the issue of potential harm to fetuses,
stating that "[d]ecisions about the welfare of future children must be
left to the parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather
than to the employers who hire the parents."' 9 3 Ultimately, of course,
the resolution of this ethical and legal dilemma is to reduce environ-
mental hazards that harm both men and women, rather than excluding
a class of persons deemed hypersusceptible. Allowing employers to
"fix the worker, not the job,"'9 4 would harm the public health. The
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) already man-
dates that employers maintain a workplace "free from recognized
hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm," and it requires the Secretary of Labor to promulgate health and
safety standards, to the extent feasible, such "that no employee will suf-
fer material impairment of health or functional capacity."' 19 5 Private
employers should not be permitted to make determinations about what
is "safe" for whole subclasses of the employed population.
preceding year in excess of 30ug/dI. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
886 F.2d 871, 876 & nn.7, 9 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 1991 US LEXIS 1715.
187 Id. at 901.
188 Id. at 885-901. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984);
Wright v. Olin Corp. 697 F.2d 1172, 1186 (4th Cir. 1982) ("the problem presented by a fetal
protection policy involved motivations and consequences most closely resembling a disparate
impact case").
189Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 888, 899-901. See also Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1543.
19°Johnson Controls, 1991 US LEXIS 1715, *19.
191 Id. at *22.
19 2 Id. at *32.
193 Id. at *33.
194 See Bertin, Fix the Job, Not the Worker, L.A. Times, Nov. 27, 1989, § B, at 7, col. 1.
195 Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1988). "OSHA
has statutory authority to protect the fetuses of lead exposed working mothers .... Harm to
fetuses is a material impairment of the reproductive systems of parents." United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1256 n.96 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913
(1981).
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The fetal protection policy in Johnson Controls was directed more
toward risks in utero than genetic risks. Suppose an employer discrimi-
nated against women only based upon' the teratogenicity of workplace
toxins. Such a case would raise squarely the issue of whether terato-
genic risks fall exclusively, or even predominantly, on women. Medical
evidence that similar toxic exposure causes deformed sperm, also lead-
ing to birth defects, would surely result in a finding of intentional gen-
der discrimination, since the brunt of the policy falls exclusively on
women, but the risks are shared by both men and women. In such cir-
cumstances, Title VII would not tolerate consigning women to a class
of employment with lower pay and potential based strictly on their abil-
ity to conceive.
E. GENETIC SPECIFIC STATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
A minority of states have enacted statutes which specifically apply
to persons with hereditary conditions.' 96 The most progressive of
these statutes recognize that disease-specific legislation might prove
too rigid as scientific understanding of the human genome pro-
gresses.' 97 These statutes have broad application to "any hereditary
disorder,' 98 and they draw the distinction between carriers and those
who experience manifestations of the disease.199 Other statutes are di-
rected more narrowly to specific conditions or traits such as sickle
cell,2 ° ° PKU, hemophilia, cystic fibrosis, Tay-Sachs or Cooley's
anemia.20 1
These various statutes do not appear to follow any coherent policy
or pattern. Only a few ban discrimination. California adopted a gen-
eral anti-discrimination policy which includes penalties for violating the
Hereditary Disorders Act of 1990. The California statute is compre-
hensive and prohibits "stigmatization" and "discrimination" against
"carriers of most deleterious genes." It also proscribes mandated state
196 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 150, 151, 155, 309, 341 (West 1990); 1990 Cal. Sen-
ate Bill 1008 (ch. 26); FLA. STAT. § 385.206 (1989); Illinois 1990 Public Act 86-1028; IOWA
CODE § 136A.2 (1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46.2254 (West 1982); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE
ANN. § 13-101; Mo. REV. STAT. § 191 (1989); N.J. REV. STAT. § 26:5B-3 (1987); 1990 N.Y.
LAws 900; VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-68. (1990).
197 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 150 (West 1990).
198 See, e.g., id; N.J. REV. STAT. § 26:5B (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12a (West Supp.
1990) (any "atypical hereditary or blood trait").
199 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 150 (West 1990).
200 FLA. STAT. § 448.075 (1989) (prohibits testing for sickle cell but no other genetic trait
or disease); id. at § 385.206 (1989) (singles out sickle cell and hemophilia for medical care
grants); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46.2254 (West 1982) (prohibits employment discrimination
only with regard to sickle cell).
201 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 191.3 (Supp. 1991) (defines genetic and metabolic disease pro-
grams to include those concerning cystic fibrosis, hemophilia, and sickle cell); 1990 N.Y. LAws
900 (including sickle cell, Tay-Sachs or Cooley's anemia).
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restrictions on child-bearing decisions regardless of the genetic
purpose.
20 2
Statutes in Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York and
North Carolina are patterned after disability law and prohibit employ-
ment discrimination against persons with any "atypical hereditary or
blood trait ' 201 or particular genetic conditions or traits. 2 4 In some
cases the statutes have general application beyond employment dis-
crimination, including disparate impact on racial or ethnic minori-
ties, 205 or discrimination on the basis of familial status when in the
process of securing legal custody. 0 6
The remainder of the genetic statutes prohibit certain types of
screening, 20 7 provide funding for research or treatment, 21 or require
mandatory information on genetic disorders to be given to marriage
applicants.20 ° Others are concerned with genetic counseling and
confidentiality.210
A review of current state statutes reveals a patchwork of provisions
which are incomplete, even inconsistent, and which fail to follow a co-
herent vision for genetic screening, counseling, treatment and preven-
tion of discrimination.
IV. CONCLUSION: FUTURE LEGAL SAFEGUARDS AGAINST
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
The course currently charted by the Human Genome Initiative is
filled with the promise of unimagined medical advancement for human-
kind. The potential harm to human beings by rendering them virtually
unemployable or uninsurable may be equally real.21' Policy makers
should consider legal strategies to prevent such genetic discrimination.
While the ADA is a powerful tool to combat genetic discrimination, its
construction should not be left to the uncertainty of future judicial de-
cisions. The ADA specifically redresses discrimination based upon past
disability ("record of impairment"), current disability ("impairment")
or perception of disability ("regarded" as impaired). The ADA, how-
202 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 150 (West 1990).
203 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12a (West Supp. 1990).
204 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.075 (1981) ("No person, firm, corporation .... state
agency.... or any public or private entity shall deny or refuse employment to any person or
discharge any person from employment solely because such person has the sickle cell trait.").
205 Illinois 1990 Public Act 86-1028, S.B. No. 1466.
206 Id.
207 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.075 (West 1988) (prohibiting testing for sickle cell).
208 E.g., id. at § 385.206 (1989); IOWA CODE § 136A.2 (1989).
209 111. 1990 Public Act 86-1028, S.B. No. 1466.
210 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 191.317, 191.320 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
211 See generally D. NELKIN & L. TANCREDI, DANGEROUS DIAGNOSTICS: THE SOCIAL POWER
OF BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION (1989).
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ever, is silent about discrimination based upon future disability. While
this paper has presented a number of legal, ethical and public policy
arguments to suggest that future disability is covered, a simple amend-
ment to section three of the ADA would remove any uncertainty. A
new subsection, "D," could amend the definition of disability to in-
clude: "having a genetic or other medically identified potential of, or
predisposition toward, such an impairment." Such language would en-
sure that discrimination against currently asymptomatic persons based
upon a future prediction of disease would be covered by the ADA.
There remains in the ADA one major gap that is not so easily recti-
fied: the exclusion of underwriting from the coverage of the Act. Fu-
ture regulations under the ADA should seek to ensure that employers
do not use this underwriting exclusion to discriminate against appli-
cants or employees because of likely financial burdens to employer ben-
efits plans. Employers may well turn to imaginative actuarial
justifications for invidious discrimination. Additionally, employers may
not need to take the drastic measure of not employing a person, as they
may make the benefits plan so unattractive and unaffordable that it may
act as a formidable barrier to disabled persons.
Strict regulations preventing employers from evading the princi-
ples of the ADA are only a stop gap remedy. Ultimately, a political
choice will have to be made by Congress as to whether insurers and
self-insurers are merely businesses, or facilitators of wider social goals.
If insurance discrimination rises to a truly unconscionable level as the
genome is mapped, then society may have to confront the issue of ac-
cess to health care.
Gaps in the coverage of disability law also need to be addressed at
the state level. State disability laws should be amended to clarify their
coverage of future disabilities. The continuing importance of state dis-
ability laws cannot be underestimated given their more efficient admin-
istrative structures, and greater resources to combat discrimination.
Policy makers will also have to confront the philosophic and prag-
matic issue of whether genetic-specific legislation is necessary or desira-
ble. The great majority of state legislatures have enacted HIV-specific
legislation,2 12 so the precedent is set for separately addressing particu-
larly vexing national public health problems. The National Human
Genome Initiative should give careful consideration to developing a set
of legislative guidelines. In the absence of such guidelines, the pros-
pect for rational legislation appears low.
Model guidelines on the law and ethics of genetic screening, confi-
dentiality and discrimination ought to go hand-in-hand with scientific
212 See Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS, supra note 65, at 1621.
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advances. Funding, original thinking and carefully crafted policy on the
legal and ethical dimensions of the Human Genome Project are as es-
sential as the science itself.
